Taiwan Today

Containment versus engagement, the PRC as ally or competitor? The new president of the United States knows that one of the more urgent tasks facing his foreign policy team is devising a blueprint for dealing with Taiwan and mainland China.

Conflict between Taiwan and mainland China will intensify as Taiwan strives to retain its identity while China tries to conquer the island. Tension between the PRC and America will be aggravated as the former seeks to dominate Asia while the United States tries to retain its place as a power in the Western Pacific. Uncertainty will dog relations between Taipei and Washington. Managing these frictions would be a daunting task in the best of times. These, however, are anxious times. All three states are experiencing troubled political leadership. All are focusing more on internal than on international issues. All have contending schools of thought on how to behave toward the other two, leaving none with a cohesive policy. Consequently, the prospects are for continual jockeying that could lead to stalemate at best and open hostilities at worst.

In America, the bitterly contested presidential election of Governor George W. Bush of Texas and the long legalistic brawl in its aftermath have left the nation split down the middle. The popular and electoral votes were nearly evenly divided. Small states, small towns, and rural counties went to the Republican candidate. Many big states and cities with large populations went to the Democratic nominee, Vice President Al Gore. More men than women voted for Bush, more women then men voted for Gore. Gore was so weak that, even as the incumbent vice president, he failed to carry his home state of Tennessee --its eleven electoral votes would have propelled him into the presidency. Bush was so weak that he failed to score a clear-cut victory in Florida, where his younger brother is governor--its twenty-five electoral votes eventually put him over the top, but it was surely not a decisive victory.

In Congress, the new Senate is almost evenly divided; the Republicans hold a bare majority in the House of Representa tives. A chasm has opened up between the elected and the electorate, with evidence in polls and press that many Americans are disenchanted with politicians of every stripe. Weeks of political and legal wrangling after the November 7 election only exacerbated those breaches. Even the courts are divided almost evenly. In one instance, the Florida Supreme Court issued a ruling by a vote of four to three. It was overturned by the United States Supreme Court, five to four. The US Supreme Court's final ruling that gave the election to Bush was so muddled that initially lawyers could not decide whether it was five to four or seven to two.

The critical question, however, is not how evenly divided America is, but how deeply. Vice President Gore, in a gracious speech conceding the election to Governor Bush, appealed to the patriotism of Americans to unite behind the president-elect. Whether that will have any effect, however, will not be known for months as the new administration struggles to seize the reins of power when it has no real mandate to govern. If the new Bush administration hopes to achieve anything, it will be forced to fashion a bipartisan or coalition government. The signs of finding a workable compact are not promising. Harsh fights in the courts and in public forums have left open wounds. The lack of statesmanship in either party during the post -election feud suggests that neither is in a mood for reconciliation.

Altogether, no one in Taiwan, China, or elsewhere in Asia should look to Washington for leadership for at least six months and possibly a year, because the president and Congress will be focused almost exclusively on domestic politics. Policy on Taiwan and mainland China was barely discussed during the election campaign and would not matter now in any case, because the new administration will most likely have its time and attention focused on generating enough political support to enable the new president to govern.

Presidential decisions on proposed national and regional missile defenses, which are highly controversial in America and in Asia, are not likely any time soon. Part of the regional or theater plan would provide a shield for Taiwan against PRC missiles. The Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, which has passed the House of Representatives and awaits action in the Senate, will be ignored for months. It would have more political than military significance, expressing strong US backing for Taiwan's continued separation from mainland China.

The turmoil in Taipei may not be so severe as that in Washington, but it is enough to impede efforts to foster new relations with Beijing. President Chen Shui-bian was elected by a small plurality, which denies him a solid mandate to govern; he and his inexperienced Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) have found governing more difficult than opposing, and the Kuomintang (KMT), or Nationalist Party, that formerly ruled the island and still controls the legislature, has shown little inclination to make common cause with President Chen on questions that affect Taiwan's security.

If the assault from the KMT was just an issue of internal politics, it might not matter much. But by its use of undiscriminating tactics the KMT, perhaps inadvertently, appears to have damaged Taiwan's reputation, which is vital to the island's survival as a separate entity, in the eyes of many Americans who follow the island's affairs. For a while, squabbles in Taiwan may go unnoticed by the United States Congress and public, both of which have been sources of essential support for Taiwan, because they will be preoccupied with the muddle of American politics. Eventually, however, Congress will return to conducting foreign policy and will undoubtedly look askance at the KMT's clumsy tactics intended for political gain.

Professor June Teufel Dreyer, a political scientist at the University of Miami who specializes in the study of China and Taiwan, said in response to a query: "I am saddened and disappointed. What we here saw in the spring as a tremendous victory for Taiwan's democracy--the peaceful replacement of one party by another through legal means--has quickly deterio rated into petty nastiness that threatens both economic and political stability. If continued, the image of Taiwan as 'the little nation that could,' in terms of economic and political development, is bound to suffer. Good reputations are quickly de stroyed; bad reputations are difficult to dispel."

In Beijing, leaders of the People's Republic of China have not yet experienced, so far as outsiders know, such wrenching turns as those in Washington and Taipei. Even so, as Robert Dujarric of the Hudson Institute, a research organization in Washington, said in response to a query: "The ruling party is ideologically bankrupt and is losing control of society." Presi dent Jiang Zemin, whose term ends in 2002, is endeavoring to straddle a rift between reformers, led by Premier Zhu Rongji, who emphasize economic progress, and hard-line leaders in the People's Liberation Army, among them Defense Minister Chi Haotian, who place a higher priority on military power.

Fresh evidence suggests that the militants are rising. When the late paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping, announced the "Four Modernizations" in 1979, economics was given top priority, mainly industry. That was followed in order by agricul ture, science and technology, and, at the bottom, defense. Beijing's recent Defense White Paper indicates that defense mod ernization is rising to the same priority level as economic progress. The White Paper says that "developing the economy and strengthening national defense are two strategic tasks in China's modernization efforts."

Some Chinese strategists have adopted the slogan "Rich Country, Strong Army," much as did Japanese leaders in the late nineteenth century as they sought to ward off incursions by Western colonialism. An assessment of China's White Paper from the Center for Naval Analysis, a think tank in Washington, asserts that defense modernization may not have "become equal to economic modernization in China's national priorities" but it is surely no longer last.

Adding to the difficulties confronting China's leaders are all manner of internal strains--separatist movements in Tibet and Xinjiang, ethnic rivalries, an inability to impose decisions on provincial governments, widespread and acknowledged corruption, political dissidence in the Falun Gong sect, unrest in other religious groups, uneconomical state-owned enter prises, water shortages, a floating population of 200 million unemployed people looking for work, inadequate collection of taxes, wide disparities in the standards of living between coast and interior, and a spreading AIDS epidemic.

With all this, more than one observer outside of China has speculated that President Jiang has pumped up the issue of Taiwan's future not only because he wants the island to come under mainland control while he is in office, but also because Taiwan offers a convenient way to distract public attention from China's painful domestic problems. As China's tribulations get worse, Jiang may be tempted to undertake risky ventures that would exploit the turbulence in Taipei and Washington. Beijing has often looked for ways to drive a wedge between the two capitals and may ratchet up the pressure on a divided Taipei while the Americans are absorbed in their own predicament.

Despite the political turmoil in the United States, three schools of thought on China and Taiwan are discernible:

Engagement: This school, led by President Bill Clinton, advocates a two-pronged effort to engage China in all manner of political, economic, and military dialogue while propounding a policy of "strategic ambiguity" to cloak what the United States would do if engagement failed to curb Chinese aggression.

In a valedictory article in the magazine Foreign Affairs , Samuel R. Berger, the White House national security adviser, asserted that President Clinton deserved credit for what he called "the most constructive breakthrough in US-China relations since normalization in 1979." Berger pointed to negotiations that would guide China into the World Trade Organization and to passage of legislation establishing Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) with China. "With China," he contended, "our challenge has been to steer between the extremes of uncritical engagement and untenable confrontation." Critics have maintained, however, that the Clinton administration has veered toward "uncritical engagement," particularly in nearly ac cepting Beijing's definition of "one China," bordering on appeasement.

Containment: Senator Jesse Helms, the outspoken chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, is among the leading advocates of opposing China at nearly every turn, as Washington did the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Helms was especially vehement last fall in arguing against awarding PNTR to Beijing. The PNTR proposal "is perhaps the most ill -advised piece of legislation to come to the Senate floor in my twenty-eight years as a senator," Helms thundered, contending that PNTR might serve US business interests but not the national interest. "America's principal national interest," he argued, "is to seek to democratize China, hoping that China will conduct its foreign relations in a civilized fashion and stop behaving in a rogue fashion." Senator Helms's critics accuse him of "demonizing" China, seeking to ascribe to Beijing not only political differences but also evil motives.

Pragmatists: A growing plurality of Americans who think about China policy appear to advocate a middle road in which the United States deals with Beijing with diplomatic and economic actions that seek to integrate China into the international order while at the same time, militarily, deterring China from aggression. Among the advocates are former Cabinet officers, senior scholars, and civic leaders.

The commander of American military forces in the Pacific and Asia, Admiral Dennis Blair, appeared to reflect this thinking in a little-noticed speech last June in Alaska, where US forces are under his control: "We do have a policy that Taiwan's future will be determined peacefully . This means we will not allow it to be bullied or invaded."

The National Committee on American Foreign Policy recently issued a report that called on the new administra tion to "recognize that China and Taiwan are now on a collision course that threatens US national security interests." The committee urged adoption of a policy that would, in effect, replace President Clinton's "strategic ambiguity" with strategic clarity. The report, four years in the making, recommended "making clear US opposition to any declaration of independence on Taiwan's part, but also making clear that the United States would respond should the PRC use force in any form, so long as Taiwan refrains from issuing a declaration of independence."

This report was an outgrowth of roundtable discussions among leaders from the United States, Taiwan, and China. Among the Americans were Winston Lord, onetime ambassador to Beijing and assistant secretary of state for East Asia, and Robert Scalapino, widely considered to be the nation's foremost scholar on Asia. From Taiwan came, among others, the Mayor of Taipei, Ma Ying-jeou, and Professor Lin Cheng-yi of Academia Sinica. China was represented by scholars such as Chu Shulong, Jia Qingguo, and Liu Guofen.

Members of the committee interviewed the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia, Stanley Roth, the United States ambassador to China, Joseph Prueher, and the director of the United States' quasi-embassy in Taipei, Raymond Burghardt. In Taiwan, they met with President Chen, former President Lee Teng-hui, Foreign Minister Tien Hung-mao, and his predeces sors in office, C.J. Chen, Jason Hu, and John Chang. Chinese leaders included President Jiang, Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan, and Wang Daohan, China's chief negotiator with Taiwan. They also met with the deputy chief of the general staff of the People's Liberation Army, Xiong Guangkai.

Another set of recommendations taking the middle road came from a high-level panel at RAND, a prominent research organization in California. Addressing the president-elect, the panel urged him to "pursue a mixed strategy toward China that is neither pure engagement nor pure containment." The RAND panel called for more commerce with China, a strategic dialogue, improved military relations, joint projects to advance common interests, emphasis on democracy in China, and hedging against a Chinese push for regional domination. If China becomes democratic, "this mixed strategy could evolve into mutual accommodation," the panel said. "If China becomes a hostile power bent on regional domination, the United States posture could evolve into containment."

On Taiwan, the panel echoed the National Committee on American Foreign Policy report mentioned above: "We recom mend stating clearly to both parties where the United States stands: that [it] opposes unilateral moves toward independence by Taiwan but will support Taiwan in the event of an unprovoked Chinese attack."

Just as there is ferment in the United States over policy toward China and Taiwan, so there is in Taiwan over the shape of the island's future. At least three alternatives have visible followings, with no consensus having yet emerged.

Independence: The pro-independence movement in Taiwan is populated largely by people born in Taiwan, supports President Chen and the DPP, and features outspoken advocates such as Vice President Annette Lu. These advocates contend that Taiwan has not been part of China for 105 years, has its own culture and identity, enjoys a thriving, modern economy, and should be recognized as a sovereign state.

Status Quo: Polls and anecdotal evidence say that a large plurality of the people in Taiwan want to remain separate from the mainland, but understand that to declare independence would cause China to resort to military force. President Chen, although still influential within the DPP, has moved into this centrist position to avoid giving China an excuse for military action. For several years, he has contended that Taiwan is a sovereign state with no need to declare formal independence.

Unification: A relatively small but still vocal group, mostly mainlanders within the KMT who retreated to Taiwan after the defeat of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in 1949, assert that Taiwan should seek a modus vivendi with the mainland and seek some sort of federation. They tend to support the concept of "one China" without defining it.

While contending schools of thought about the Taiwan-United States-China triangle are relatively easy to discern in the United States and Taiwan, they are heavily veiled in China, where discussion goes on behind closed doors or at summer retreats on the beach at Beidaihe. Nonetheless, American scholars, intelligence analysts, and other specialists have been able to read Chinese tea leaves with increasing skill. Chinese who give top priority to economics advocate good relations with the United States, because China has become so dependent on the American economy, exporting US$81.8 billion worth of goods to the United States in 1999 and on track to equal that in 2000. A severe reduction of exports to the US market would seriously damage the Chinese economy, especially its foreign exchange earnings.

Despite that economic incentive, Chinese who see the United States as a political adversary and potential military foe are increasingly influential. Many American analysts discern a narrowing over the past year in the differences among Chinese leaders on issues of national security. Bonnie Glaser, an independent analyst, writes in a recent paper for the National Intel ligence Council, "There is now greater agreement among Chinese America specialists than previously existed in their analy sis of...United States strategy and objectives toward China." (The council is a civilian group that advises the Central Intelli gence Agency.)

According to Glaser, the Chinese consensus holds that "the United States is striving to contain, constrain, or otherwise check China. Most Chinese analysts and officials are convinced that the United States' near-term objective is to preserve the cross-strait status quo, and its long-term aim is to prevent the unification of the mainland and Taiwan." This assessment, she concludes, "may lead to the judgment that a Sino-US military confrontation in the Taiwan Strait is inevitable."

In sum, all new years start off with an element of uncertainty and sometimes dread about the coming twelve months. But the year 2001 will have a larger share of unknowns that may be coupled with a strong dose of fear.

Copyright 2001 by Richard Halloran.